ERHAPS NOTHING is both more ancient and more current than human misery. From Gilgamesh and Job to the contemporary furor over death and dying, suffering has marked human life and posed questions which demand our deepest responses. Because misfortune, pain, and death inevitably provoke questions of meaning, they are a central concern for philosophy, religion, and culture as a whole. As Max Scheler remarks, A doctrine on the meaning of pain and suffering was, in all lands, at all times, in the whole world, at the core of the teachings and directives which the great religious and philosophical thinkers gave to men. On this meaning was built an instruction and an invitation to encounter suffering correctly, to suffer properly (or, to eliminate suffering).
ceedings of 1326, his accusers list fifteen articles which are "taken from a book which Meister Eckhart sent to the queen of Hungary, written in German. The book begins thus: Benedictus deus et pater domini nostri Ihesu Christi." 6 In virtue of the opening verse and the suspect articles, this work is unmistakably the Book of Divine Consolation. More than a century later, John Wenck confirms the address to "the queen of Hungary" and adds that she was also "sister of the dukes of Austria."
7 G. Théry has demonstrated that Eckhart composed the work for Agnes, queen of Hungary (d. 1364) . 8 Agnes provided an appropriate audience for this consolatory work, because she suffered a devastating series of family deaths, the most cataclysmic of which was the assassination of her father, Albert I of Hapsburg, in 1308. Agnes was also receptive to the Book's counsels of detachment and single-minded devotion to God, since she entered a convent at Königsfeld and "became well known in the mystical circles of the fourteenth century." 9 Eckhart's address of the treatise to this aristocratic, troubled, and pious woman specifies the pastoral, consolatory nature of the work.
More fundamentally, the Book's sources and themes reflect its place in the consolation tradition. For instance, Eckhart cites Seneca's advice to those suffering misfortune: "It is for a man to accept everything as if he had wished for it and had asked for it; for you would have wished for it, if you had known that everything happens by God's will, with His will and in His will." 10 A more pervasive influence is Boethius' Consolation of Philosophy, which criticizes attachment to "false goods" and moves toward a divine, intellective vision of misfortune and suffering. And by its insistent use of biblical and patristic texts the Book belongs to the genre of specifically Christian consolation literature. Moreover, later in the fourteenth century, John of Dambach (d. 1372) in turn uses excerpts from Eckhart's Book in composing his own Consolatio theologiae. While the Book's place in this consolatory tradition has generally been recognized, commentators have rarely attempted to examine its themes of suffering and consolation in detail. 11 Yet the work's very title proclaims its message of consolation, which Eckhart correlates with a doctrine and art of suffering. Throughout the Book suffering (leit, lîden) and comfort or consolation (troestung, trôst, trösten) form a dialectical pair. We shall approach Eckhart's Book in terms of this dialectic.
The Book is divided into three sections. The first sketches basic doctrines concerning the transcendental, divine sonship, the natural "bitterness" of creation, and the single-minded turn to God. Here Eckhart writes: "If you want to be free of all affliction and suffering, hold fast to God, and turn wholly to Him, and to no one else" (211,12). In the second and longest portion of the work Eckhart argues like a lawyer and presents "some thirty topics, each single one of which ought readily to console a rational man in his sorrow" (213, 15). Here the correlation of suffering and consolation varies widely, as Eckhart mixes commonplace counsels, scholastic speculation, and mystical theology. Just this mix, however, expresses Eckhart's pastoral and speculative concerns as he develops an art of suffering and consolation. While his presentation is diffuse, even scattershot, Eckhart nevertheless grounds this art in his distinctive doctrines of divine unity, principiai knowledge, and the Son's birth in the soul. This second section will therefore provide the main focus for our analysis. The Book's brief third part cites exemplary instances of the art of suffering and concludes with an apologia for Eckhart's teaching.
PERSPECTIVE AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF SUFFERING
To indicate Eckhart's varied correlation of suffering and consolation, let us first note his simpler, more mundane counsels. He writes, "There is no affliction and harm that is without consolation," and illustrates this maxim with an example: A man has a hundred marks, of which he loses forty and retains sixty. If he is going to think day and night about the forty he has lost, he will never stop feeling aggrieved and sorry for himself.. If you have lost a thousand marks, you ought not to lament the thousand marks that are lost. You should thank God who gave you a thousand marks to lose, and who permits you to exercise the virtue of patience and so to gain that eternal life which many thousands of men will not possess. (223-24,36) Other comforts amount to little more than saying that things could be worse. For instance, a sick man is urged to be thankful for his home, medicine, and family's care in contrast to the poor who, whatever their discomfort, "have to go out begging a crust of bread in the rain and the snow and the cold from house to house"; here Eckhart advises us to "forget those who are better off and think of all those for whom things are worse" (214, 17). These consolations are the stuff of proverbs and folklore. As a kind of psychological chicken soup, they exhibit Eckhart's pastoral concern to use familiar experiences and easily accessible arguments to temper sorrow. Here, as in his theology and mysticism generally, Eckhart aims not at producing extraordinary experiences or revelations but at seeing our lived reality in a new way. 12 Hence, even these commonplace maxims and examples illustrate a basic pattern in the Book: a change of perspective brings consolation in suffering. Because our attitudes and affections are so deeply involved in our misfortunes and pains, a perspective which changes our perception and feeling thereby alters the experience of suffering itself. In the previous instances the shifts of perspective are minor: think of the sixty marks you still have, or of those whose misery is greater than yours. But as Eckhart moves into divine knowledge, the perspectival shifts become increasingly radical and their healing power progressively stronger; chicken soup then gives way to veritable psychosurgery.
In the Book Eckhart aims to see and experience suffering from the standpoint of God Himself. To move beyond finite perspectives on human pain requires a fundamental reorientation of will and intellect. Eckhart expresses this reorientation in paradoxes which intensify the dialectic of suffering and consolation and finally carry it into the Godhead itself. loss of suffering that he alone loves for the sake of God. And therefore I say that such a man also hates "shall-suffer," for that also is not [present] suffering.
13
The blessed nevertheless prefer future to past suffering, because it holds the promise of actual pain instead of the mere memory of suffering already endured. Whatever masochistic tendencies we may suspect here, Eckhart's point is less to encourage extreme penitential practices-which receive no mention in the treatise-than to confer new meaning and direction on the inevitable experience of suffering. He does not counsel the good to seek suffering but to bear it correctly, "for the sake of justice." This emphasis becomes clear in his discussion of the equanimity which "suffering for the sake of God" brings. Pain, misfortune, and even sin and remorse for sin are transformed when "I take and draw the suffering in God's will and from God's will. Only such sorrow is perfect sorrow, because it proceeds from a pure love of God's purest goodness and joy" (217, 22). Suffering then yields exaltation and deification, since "the good man, insofar as he is good, becomes possessed of all the properties of goodness itself, which God is in Himself."
14 From this metaphysical axiom Eckhart concludes that this man lives "on earth" as God does "in heaven," that is, in equanimity and peace. He will be "completely consoled and joyful, at all times and under all circumstances"; therefore "misfortune serves him as if it were good fortune, and sorrow as much as joy."
15
In these passages the dialectic of suffering and consolation assumes new psychological intensity and depth. In the commonplace counsels cited above, consolation and suffering are related as opposites, and comfort arises from countering sorrow and directing attention elsewhere. Here, however, suffering bears consolation within itself insofar as it is centered upon God. Suffering and comfort coincide when "suffering for the sake of justice" itself consoles the good. ing his commentary, Eckhart says: "My suffering is in God, and my suffering is God." 17 God is not only our fellow sufferer but our very suffering somehow becomes divine. This paradox places Eckhart's art of suffering and consolation squarely within his metaphysics and mystical theology; for Eckhart frames this declaration in terms of divine unity. He refers to "God's attribute, that He is the purely one, without any accidental admixture of distinction, even in thought; that everything that is in Him is God Himself."
18 Therefore, since I suffer "in" God, Eckhart says, "my suffering is God. Truly, as God is Truth and as I find the Truth, I find my God, the Truth, there; and too, neither more nor less, as I find pure suffering for the love of God and in God, I find God my suffering" (235, 54). Divine unity is among Eckhart's most pervasive themes. In the tradition of Neoplatonism he conceives divine unity as prior to all distinction and opposition, and as enfolding all multiplicity in its simplicity. In virtue of this ontological priority "God is one in Himself and separated from everything else,"
19 radically other than finite, distinct beings; yet this very difference simultaneously tenders the one God "indistinct" from all things, because all opposites so coincide in divine unity that "everything that is in God is God Himself." 20 The Book brings this unity metaphysics to bear upon the pastoral work of consolation. Eckhart claims that the sons of God are strangers to goodness, truth, and everything that tolerates any distinction, be it in a thought or a name, in a notion or just a shadow of a distinction. They are intimates of the One that is bare of every kind of multiplicity and distinction. In the One, "God-Father-Son-and-Holy-Spirit" are stripped of every distinction and property, and are one. And the One makes us blessed
The closer we are to the One, the more truly are we God's sons and His Son, and also the more truly 
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Him so joyful that it is for Him not suffering. And therefore, if we thought rightly, suffering would not be suffering for us; it would be our joy and our consolation.
21
Divine unity thus underlies the psychological coincidence of suffering and comfort. Because delight and suffering are one in God, we too "suffer without suffering" as we penetrate to divine unity.
How, then, are we to attain this unity? Here Eckhart's mystical noetic or theory of knowledge comes into play, as he first conceives unity in terms of intellect and then specifies intellect as the primary locus for mystical union. The Latin sermon on the text "Deus unus est" (Gal 3:20) effectively summarizes these themes. Because "unity or the one seems to be proper to or the property of intellect alone," Eckhart says that "God alone is in the true sense of the word, that He is intellect or understanding, and that He is understanding alone, purely and simply, apart from any other being."
22 Eckhart then draws the anagogical conclusion that union with God occurs in the intellect. Citing the authority of Augustine, he says: "To ascend to the intellect... and to be subjected to it is to be united with God." 23 In terms of the Book, intellect is thus that "highest power pain and misfortune are seen from finite and worldly perspectives, they yield suffering. As Boethius finds only sorrow in subjection to Fortune and her goods, Eckhart notes how "impossible" it is "for a man to find true consolation who seeks his consolation in created things" (213,15). Further, by emphasizing intellect and principiai knowledge, Eckhart too strives to view suffering sao specie aeternitatis, but in a more radical fashion than Boethius. Whereas Boethius laboriously strives toward this vision, Eckhart proclaims it from the start and draws overtly mystical conclusions from it. For Eckhart, in knowing as God knows, we come to suffer as God suffers-happily, with serene equanimity and "without suffering." In divine knowledge, suffering and delight are as "equal" as fleas and angels, since they too coincide in God's unifying knowledge. Eckhart thus speaks principially in saying, "My suffering is in God, and my suffering is God." Here Eckhart's teaching once again appears conventional. The incarnate Christ offers both the paradigm for human suffering and the ultimate consolation, because his passion and death heal and save. Our sufferings are "trials" whereby we participate in Christ's passion and become sons of God. Nevertheless, Eckhart's treatment of so conventional a theme is noteworthy; for in contrast to much medieval piety after Anselm and Bernard of Clairvaux, he does not dwell on images of Jesus' passion and death. Eckhart's concern is not the imaginative contemplation of historical events but intellectual vision and the timeless process of becoming sons of God. He therefore abruptly places Jesus' historicity in principiai perspective, as he uses it to connect the themes of suffering and sonship. He here comments at length on God as the fellow sufferer whose pain is delight and who takes our suffering into His very being (232-35, 49-54).
Eckhart's discussion of the cross similarly emphasizes the transposition of suffering into divine sonship. He comments on Jesus' statement, "If any man will come to me, he should forsake and deny himself and take up his cross" (Mt 16:24). In this passage the cross brings together the themes of detachment and "coming to" the Son. By emptying oneself, detachment yields equanimity and delight in suffering.
For truly, if anyone had denied himself and had wholly forsaken himself, nothing could be for him a cross or sorrow or suffering; it would all be delight to him, a happiness, a joy to his heart, and he would truly be coming to God and following Him. For just as nothing can grieve or afflict God, so nothing can make such a man rueful or sad. (230, 45) Here the cross becomes the symbolic focus for the dialectic of suffering and consolation, as this crucifixion promises divine sonship. Eckhart writes that When our Lord, the Son, says, "Let him deny himself and lift up his cross and come to me," that means: Let him become a Son, as I am Son (werde sun, als ich sun bin), God-begotten, and let him become that same one which I am, which I, being and remaining in the bosom and the heart of the Father, create. God, and are consoled as we indeed become one with the divine Son.
37
This becoming involves the pain of de-cathexis as we "empty" ourselves of created being with its differences and multiplicity. Yet this pain in fact sets aside the natural "bitterness" and nothingness of creatures in themselves and thereby leads into divine unity and fulness, because as the soul "possesses less of created things, and is emptier of all things that are not God, it receives God more purely, and is more totally in Him, and it truly becomes one with God" (222, 32) . Here the soul finds consolation and delight; for as it becomes God's son, the soul takes on the very "attributes" (eigenschaft) of God (229, 44); it knows, loves, and acts in and as the Son Himself. Divine sonship is thus the foundation for Eckhart's mystical noetics and art of suffering; for only as the soul's "highest powers" are so transformed as to become "the sons of God and God's Only-Begotten Son" (211,11) does the human intellect attain the principiai knowledge which views suffering sub specie aeternitatis. A similar transformation affects love and will. Because "God loves for His own sake and performs all things for His own sake," Eckhart concludes that "whoever, born of God, is God's son loves God for His sake alone. That is, he loves God for the sake of loving God, and performs all his works for the sake of working." 38 This single-minded love yields the paradoxical desire for present suffering that we noted above; for a good man wants and would always want to suffer for God's sake, not to have suffered; for suffering, he has what he loves. He loves suffering for God's sake, and he suffers for the sake of God. Therefore and thereby is he God's son, formed in God's likeness and in God, who loves for His own sake.
39
In its transforming power this suffering simultaneously effects and exemplifies the process of becoming sons of God. Conversely, in His incarnation and passion the divine Son discloses the God who "suffers so willingly with us and for our sake ... [but] without suffering" (233, 51). As we become sons of God, we suffer as God suffers-in detachment, principiai knowledge, and concentrated love. This art of suffering then coincides with divine consolation, because "My suffering is in God, and my suffering is God."
To summarize, Eckhart's Book of Divine Consolation develops a complex dialectic of suffering and consolation which engages the most fundamental themes of his thought: detachment, principiai knowledge, di- claim that "What matters above all is the attitude we take toward suffering, the attitude in which we take suffering upon ourselves Suffering ceases to be suffering in some way at the moment it finds a meaning, such as the meaning of sacrifice." 45 For us, Frankl's assertion that suffering with meaning "in some ways ceases to be suffering" may echo Eckhart's paradox about "suffering without suffering." For the Book consistently proclaims "attitudes" which transform the experience of suffering by conferring meanings upon it. Even the work's lighter, commonplace comforts modify the perspective within which we suffer, while Eckhart's "principiai" viewpoint marks a profound reorientation in our attitudes toward suffering.
Eckhart's altered perspective on suffering requires an acknowledgment of its meaning. Hence throughout the Book consolation consists in an interpretation of suffering which assimilates it to traditional categories, themes, and symbols; for the meanings which Eckhart proposes for suffering are not private and unique but embedded in the common, public world of medieval Christendom. Eckhart's scriptural and patristic texts, and the themes of crucifixion and sonship, are hardly esoteric materials in the fourteenth century. Indeed, the consoling, healing power of the Book derives in large measure from the very familiarity of these materials; for Eckhart proclaims a traditional language which expresses and organizes the otherwise chaotic and inexpressible experiences of pain, suffering, and dying. 46 This language overcomes the isolating privacy of suffering by drawing it into a widely-shared cultural tradition. Eckhart summons those suffering to conform their experience to a Christian interpretation and art of suffering. He invites them into what Scheler calls "blessed suffering":
The Christian doctrine of suffering asks more than a patient tolerance of suffering. It asks-better: it points to blessed suffering. It believes, in its very core, that only blessed man, i.e. man depending on God, tolerates pain and suffering in a correct manner, loves suffering, and, when necessary, can seek it out.
47
In light of Christ's passion and exaltation, suffering becomes sacrifice and purification, 48 which lead into divine unity and sonship. Eckhart reminds his readers, from Queen Agnes to ourselves, of the central place of suffering in Christian tradition and practice. Eckhart develops these themes with extraordinary rhetorical intensity and dialectical power; for his interpretations filter Christendom's lingua franca through the speculative categories of a Platonizing scholasticism. One consequence of this process is the austere intellectualism of the Book, as Eckhart ignores imaginative, affective contemplation of Christ's passion in favor of principiai knowledge. In this respect the Book resembles Boethius' serene Consolation of Philosophy more than the heated devotion to Christ's passion found in Henry Suso, Eckhart's own disciple. 49 Another consequence is that Eckhart's assimilation of suffering to traditional language and categories transforms the tradition itself. Whereas medieval thought generally distinguished sharply between divine impassibility and the suffering humanity of Christ, Eckhart's principiai vision transposes the cross into the divine life. Divine impassibility then does not exclude suffering but binds it to joy in a simple unity where God "suffers without suffering.'' Along with the Son's birth, his suffering and death become timeless events in which we are called to participate because they alone initiate us into divine joy and life. In this way Eckhart's dialectic of suffering and consolation points toward a "theology of the pain of God" 50 and a mystical participation in that consoling pain. Eckhart's handling of this dialectic exemplifies a basic pattern in his thinking, as he consistently radicalizes traditional themes: Boethius' striving for intellectual vision becomes principiai knowledge; contemptus mundi becomes detachment not only from the paltriness and misery of creatures but from their nothingness; divine sonship becomes the deification of the soul; and crucifixion becomes the suffering of God Himself. As de Gandillac has commented, a dialectical impulse drives Eckhart to take traditional texts and themes to their most extreme conclusions. Pièces relatives" 165-66 ). Yet the objection is directed not against Eckhart's docfrine of suffering but against his claims concerning sonship and the good man's transformation into God-themes also challenged in the surrounding articles taken from the Book.
